Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries: Research Frontiers

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#### World Bank and GWU Sustainable Cities Workshop

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














(a) Local Expenditure Share




(a) Local Expenditure Share

(b) Local Revenue Composition

# How Much Does Local Gov't Funding Vary?



# How Does Revenue Vary With Discretion Over Taxes?



Notes Budgetary Ratio (SNG %, GG Tax Revenue): Share of Subnational Government in Consolidated General Government Tax Revenue. Data Saurzes: World Observatory on Subnational Government Finance and Investment (WOFI)

Source: Vincent (2023), Multi-Layer Tax Arrangements, A New Dataset.




Citizens





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


#### Government










# Ration of Tax Revenue to GDP in High vs Low-Income Countries



Source: Brockmeyer et al (2023), Taxing Property in Developing Countries.

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#### Cons:

- Cadaster are incomplete or valuations outdated
- Non-compliance due to limited enforcement
- Liquidity constraints
- Manual collection, corruption

 $\Rightarrow$  How to improve property tax design and raise revenue?

Thought #1/3

# Getting the Tax Rate Right


Or how to make people pay more

Thought #1/3

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
Or how to make (some) people pay more

# In Mexico City, Raising the Tax Rate Raises Payment



Source: Brockmeyer et al (2023), Taxing Property in Developing Countries.

### ...Although Compliance Falls



Source: Brockmeyer et al (2023), Taxing Property in Developing Countries.

# In Kasaï Centrale, Congo DRC, Payment Falls With Tax Rate

	Outcome: Tax Compliance (Indicator)			
	All properties		Low-value properties	High-value properties
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Treatment Effects				
50% Reduction	0.074***	0.073***	0.076***	0.050***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.012)
33% Reduction	0.044***	0.044***	0.046***	0.026**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.010)
17% Reduction	0.011**	0.011***	0.014***	-0.013
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Mean (control)	0.056	0.056	0.057	0.046


Source: Bergeron et al (2021), The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates.

Thought #2/3

# Getting Enforcement Right


Or how to make **more** people pay

# Enforcement Increases Payment in Mexico City



Source: Brockmeyer et al (2023), Taxing Property in Developing Countries.

### Enforcement Widens the Tax Net in Monrovia, Liberia



Source: Okunogbe (2021), Becoming Legible to the State.

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Enforcement generates a <u>welfare cost</u>: e.g. fear of fines & property seizure

 $\Rightarrow$  Need to take spillovers and welfare cost into account when thinking about optimal targeting of enforcement

Thought #3/3

# Getting Public Service Provision Right

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Making everyone pay more?

# The Habitat Program in Mexico City

#### Playground in San Lucas, Iztapalapa



(a) Pre-Habitat, 2008

(b) Post-Habitat, 2014

## Habitat investments: Street Lighting

#### Street Lights and Upgraded Electrics in San Lucas, Iztapalapa



(a) Pre-Habitat, 2008

(b) Post-Habitat, 2014

# Habitat polygons in Mexico City

- 20 urban polygons (Control: 8 / Treatment: 12)
- 437 street blocks
  (C: 262 / T: 175)
- 7,947 properties
  (C: 3,697 / T: 4,250)





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


# Habitat polygons in Mexico City





### Effect of Habitat on Property Tax Compliance



Source: Brockmeyer et al (2023), The Fiscal Contract Up Close.

#### Effect of Trash Collection in Carrefour, Haiti

	Amount of Tax Paid in USD	
	FY19	FY19-FY20
	(1)	(2)
Tax Collection	$-9.22^{**}$ (4.53)	$-12.47^{*}$ (7.40)
Public Goods	0.55(1.54)	1.37(2.56)
PUBLIC X TAX	6.96(5.66)	5.76(9.89)
Linear Combination	-1.71(3.43)	-5.33(5.75)
Mean	13.1	21.86
F-Stat	30.24	31.22
Observations	40,060	40,060
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.03

Source: Krause (2020), Balancing Purse and Peace.

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 Enforcement almost always works, but setting it optimally requires accounting for spillovers and welfare costs

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**Progress** in developing our understanding of what works in urban public finance in the context of LMICs

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<u>New methods and data</u> used in collaboration with LG partners: RCTs, quasi-experiments, new models

## Other Questions Being Studied

- Technology (for detection, cadaster updates, tax collectors, taxpayers): Okunogbe in Liberia, Dzansi et al in Ghana, Knebelmann et al in Senegal, Bergeron et al in Congo DRC
  - See Knebelmann (2022) for an overview property tax digitalization projects
- Social norms, tax morale, public disclosure: Best et al in Brazil, Manwaring & Reagan in Uganda
- **Updating the tax base:** Knebelmann et al in Senegal, Reagan in Uganda
- Amnesties (popular after Covid) and dynamic incentives: Lauletta & Montana Campos, Londono-Velez & Tortarolo

### Open Avenues for Future Research & Policy Collaboration

> Automating payments through new technologies

- > Provision of liquidity via early bird discounts or installment payment
- Optimal progressivity of property taxes, and interaction with the availability of other tax and transfer instruments
- Other local taxes on economic activity

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Thank you!

Appendix

#### Tax Increases Raise Revenue: RD

